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Comment
CATCH ME IF YOU CAN: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S LONG-
WINDED CHASE TO ROUND UP IMMIGRANTS AND
DEFUND SANCTUARY CITIES
MONIKA CHAWLA*
“We are a country that jealously guards the separation of powers,
and we must be ever-vigilant in that endeavor.”1
I. LACING UP ITS SHOES: THE GOVERNMENT BEGINS ITS HOT PURSUIT
OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
Imagine a group of Spanish-speaking immigrants congregated at their
local church in Manhattan.2  As they commence their usual prayers, en-
joying the respite from their daily hurdles, two federal immigration agents
appear at the door.3  Suddenly, their daily prayer has turned into an expe-
rience saddled with fear and uncertainty.4  For the undocumented immi-
grants, participating in communal daily prayers raises the possibility of
being detained—a drastically different reality than that of an average
churchgoer.5  Today, millions of other undocumented immigrants are at
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Girish and Seema Chawla, as well as my boyfriend, Calum Wagner, for their
endless love and support.  I would also like to thank all members of the Villanova
Law Review who spent so many hours providing helpful feedback throughout the
writing and publication process.
1. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018).
2. See Liz Robbins, In a “Sanctuary City,” Immigrants Are Still at Risk, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/nyregion/sanctuary-cit-
ies-immigrants-ice.html [https://perma.cc/Z8FY-MJV3] (describing a congrega-
tion at Saint Peter’s Church located in Midtown Manhattan providing shelter for
Spanish-speaking immigrants).
3. See id. (recounting story of Reverend Amandus J. Derr, a pastor at Saint
Peter’s Church, who claimed he escorted two agents from United States Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE) out of his church during a congregation).
4. See id. (noting visit by ICE agents left members of congregation, particu-
larly undocumented immigrants, worried about their safety and future).  As an
effort to track down undocumented immigrants in recent years, ICE agents have
appeared in New York’s courthouses, individuals’ homes, and in this instance, a
church. See id.
5. See id. (noting starkly different life paths faced by U.S. citizens and undocu-
mented immigrants in event of run-in with law enforcement).  Undocumented im-
migrants are not guaranteed safety merely by living in sanctuary cities, because ICE
agents do not require permission from state police to exercise full discretion in
arresting immigrants. See id. See generally City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of
the United States, 916 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting how ICE uses tools
(191)
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risk of detainment and deportation under the Trump Administration’s
strict enforcement of federal immigration policies.6
Over the last few years, the Administration has taken a hardline posi-
tion on immigration enforcement, threatening mass deportation, enacting
travel bans, and directing the Department of Justice (DOJ) to aggressively
enforce federal immigration laws.7  As a result, immigrant communities
across the nation live in constant apprehension.8  Undocumented immi-
grants are often victims of and important witnesses to crimes, but fear that
approaching local authorities will result in deportation.9  To reassure im-
migrant residents of their safety, jurisdictions across the United States
have declared or reaffirmed themselves “sanctuary cities” and announced
their refusal to cooperate with the government’s strict immigration en-
forcement procedures.10
such as immigration detainers to facilitate cooperation between the state and na-
tional governments).  The court outlined the procedure for arresting undocu-
mented immigrants as such:
Once ICE identifies a removable alien who is in state or local custody, it
cannot simply wrest that individual from custody.  Instead, it may issue a
detainer, which serves to “advise another law enforcement agency that
[it] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for
the purpose of arresting and removing the alien.”
Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 287 (2019)).
6. See generally Susana A. Sandoval Vargas, Sanctuary Jurisdictions: In a System of
Checks and Balances, Who Has the Authority to Defeat Them?, 14 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 186,
186–87 (2018) (noting that while President Trump only vowed to deport all “bad
hombres,” or Mexican immigrants with serious criminal records including
criminals, drug dealers, and rapists, ultimately entire immigrant communities, in-
cluding non-criminals, are affected by “[d]eportation, prolonged detentions, de-
naturalization, and family separation”).
7. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 281 n.2 (explaining how immigration
enforcement falls primarily under the responsibility of the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS), which utilizes a variety of methods to enforce federal immi-
gration policy).  Working under the DHS, ICE is the law enforcement agency that
identifies, apprehends, and removes illegal immigrants from the United States. See
id. See generally Ilya Somin, Reclaiming and Restoring Constitutional Norms: Making
Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration’s Attack on Sanctuary Cities Unin-
tentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1247,
1247–48 (2019) (stating Trump Administration’s efforts to engage local govern-
ments in enforcement of federal immigration policy has ultimately resulted in sev-
eral legal challenges).
8. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 280 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding
that undocumented immigrants who are witnesses to or victims of crimes may
avoid contacting local police because “they fear that reporting will bring the scru-
tiny of the federal immigration authorities to their home,” putting themselves or
their undocumented family members at risk).
9. See id. (expanding on how fear of immigration authorities is a source of
frustration for many sanctuary jurisdictions, as lack of cooperation and assistance
with local authorities hinders local law enforcement efforts and perpetuates repeat
offenses by criminals with knowledge that their crimes will rarely be reported in
immigrant communities).
10. See H. Robert Baker, A Brief History of Sanctuary Cities, TROPICS META (Feb.
2, 2017), https://tropicsofmeta.com/2017/02/02/a-brief-history-of-sanctuary-cit-
ies/ [https://perma.cc/E8CR-DR8C] (noting “sanctuary city” became a relevant
2
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Sanctuary city is a broad term used to describe jurisdictions with “im-
migrant-friendly” policies in place to effectively limit cooperation with fed-
eral authorities on immigration-related matters.11  Though this term has
entered common usage in the current political climate, sanctuary jurisdic-
tions are far from a new phenomenon.12  They emerged in the early 1980s
to protect refugees fleeing civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala.13
Since then, many cities continue to support and protect immigrant com-
munities within their borders, particularly immigrants with strong ties to
the community and no criminal records.14  As sanctuary jurisdictions limit
the enforcement of federal immigration laws, they have become a prime
term when a Los Angeles pastor deemed his church a “sanctuary” for destitute and
undocumented immigrants).  The term evolved to include cities that openly
pushed back against federal immigration policies under the Bush and Obama Ad-
ministrations. See id.  More than 300 jurisdictions across the country, including
cities and counties, currently have sanctuary policies in place. See id.; see also Judith
McDaniel, The Sanctuary Movement, Then and Now, RELIGION & POL. (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://religionandpolitics.org/2017/02/21/the-sanctuary-movement-then-and-
now/ [https://perma.cc/79PL-SUR2] (discussing how Los Angeles informally be-
came a sanctuary city in 1979 when it filed a police order preventing police from
inquiring about the immigration status of residents).  San Francisco is another city
that openly declared itself a sanctuary city and even filed a lawsuit against the
Trump Administration upon issuance of an executive order that threatened to
withdraw federal funds from sanctuary jurisdictions. See id.
11. See McDaniel, supra note 10 (defining sanctuary cities). See generally
Somin, supra note 7, at 1247 (providing further background information about
sanctuary cities).
12. See generally McDaniel, supra note 10 (describing history of the “Sanctuary
Movement”).
13. See id. (recounting advent of Sanctuary Movement, which formed to offer
protection to undocumented refugees fleeing Central American wars).  During the
1980s, churches in California and Arizona assisted and housed survivors of mass
killings in El Salvador and Guatemala, who crossed the border from Mexico into
the United States. See id.  After the U.S. government announced it would not allow
refugees fleeing these killings to file for asylum and instead would return them to
their respective countries, religious groups in California and Arizona declared
themselves “sanctuaries” and began building communities to house the refugees.
See id.  Over time, churches, synagogues, mosques, and Quaker meeting houses
began to function as sanctuaries and refused to let immigration authorities enter
their “sacred spaces” to make arrests. See id.
14. See Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded?, CNN
POL. (Mar. 26, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanc-
tuary-cities-explained/index.html [https://perma.cc/S863-TESA] (observing dif-
ferent ways cities have stood up for immigrant communities).  Los Angeles does
not allow its police to stop people solely to determine their immigration status. See
id.  Chicago and San Francisco have developed city funds to provide legal services
to both documented and undocumented immigrants. See id.  Chicago has also cre-
ated a “welcoming city ordinance,” which provides that it will not cooperate with
immigration detentions or investigate the citizenship status of residents unless it is
mandated by a law or court. See id.; see also CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-005(c)
(2016).  Additionally, a dozen other states and the District of Columbia allow un-
documented immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses. See id. (detailing certain juris-
dictions’ specific protection policies).
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target of the Trump Administration.15  On January 25, 2017, shortly after
his inauguration, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,768, titled
“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” (the Execu-
tive Order), which declared jurisdictions that willfully refuse to share the
immigration and citizenship status of residents were ineligible “to receive
[f]ederal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement pur-
poses.”16  The order authorized the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to designate certain jurisdictions as sanctuary
cities.17  It also directed the Attorney General to withhold DOJ-sponsored
funds to sanctuary cities, including any cities that hindered the enforce-
ment of any federal laws.18  The County of Santa Clara, however, chal-
lenged the Executive Order three months after its release, and the Ninth
Circuit permanently enjoined the order on the grounds that tying federal
aid to immigration policy violated the constitutional separation of
powers.19
15. See Vargas, supra note 6, at 186 (noting that immigration enforcement and
deportation of immigrants with criminal records were prioritized by Trump Ad-
ministration); see also Somin, supra note 7, at 1247 (noting one of the policies of
President Trump’s agenda was to challenge cities failing to enforce federal immi-
gration laws).
16. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (declaring
sanctuary jurisdictions ineligible to receive federal grants, except as Attorney Gen-
eral deems necessary).  Executive Order 13,768 provides the Attorney General can
take appropriate enforcement actions against any jurisdiction that willfully refuses
to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. See id. (detailing government’s attempt to prevent
information-sharing regarding immigration and citizenship status among govern-
ment officials); see also Caitlin Yilek, Trump “Sanctuary Cities” Executive Order Is Un-
constitutional, U.S. Appeals Court Rules, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 1, 2018), https://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/us-appeals-court-trump-sanctuary-cities-exec-
utive-order-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/3FPL-78B7] (discussing how Exec-
utive Order was part of Trump Administration’s efforts to crack down on sanctuary
cities and jurisdictions that offer protections to illegal immigrants). See generally
Somin, supra note 7, at 1250–51 (discussing contents of Executive Order No.
13,768).
17. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1251 (enumerating the powers of the Secretary
of the DHS).
18. See id. (enumerating Attorney General’s power to enforce Executive
Order).
19. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1219 (N.D. Cal.
2017), aff’d sub nom, City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th
Cir. 2018) (holding that conditioning receipt of federal funds on active participa-
tion in federal immigration enforcement violates constitutional prohibition of fed-
eral commandeering”); City & County of San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1225 (affirming
district court’s injunction).  The Ninth Circuit explained that “[a]bsent [any] con-
gressional authorization, the Administration may not redistribute or withhold
properly appropriated funds in order to [further] its own policy goals.” See id. at
1235. See generally P.J. D’Annunzio, Federal Appeals Court Ruling a Win for Philadel-
phia’s Sanctuary City Policy, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 15, 2019, 11:08 AM), https:/
/www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2019/ 02/15/federal-appeals-court-affirms-
philadelphias-sanctuary-city-policy/?slreturn=20190814205247 [https://perma.cc/
M2P3-FKXG] (discussing how Northern District of California judge blocked en-
forcement of President Trump’s Executive Order, which barred federal funds
from sanctuary cities).
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Despite this holding, the Attorney General continued furthering the
policy goals of the Trump Administration by adding new conditions to
applications for law enforcement grants, notably the Edward Byrne Memo-
rial Justice Assistance Grant (the Byrne Grant).20  Sanctuary cities recently
challenged both President Trump’s Executive Order and the DOJ’s condi-
tions on Byrne Grant funds, successfully arguing both actions were uncon-
stitutional uses of power.21  Courts addressed the issue, by and large
holding that the Executive Order violates the Tenth Amendment and the
Spending Clause.22  They held that the power to condition federal grants
is strictly under the purview of Congress, and that former Attorney Gen-
eral Jeff Sessions exceeded his statutory authority by imposing the condi-
tions in his capacity as Attorney General.23
In July 2019, the Ninth Circuit deviated from what was slowly becom-
ing a trend of federal courts protecting sanctuary cities and their access to
federal funds.24  In evaluating applicants for the Community Oriented Po-
20. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 276–80 (7th Cir. 2018) (hold-
ing Attorney General lacked authority to impose “notice” and “access” conditions
on City of Chicago’s application for Byrne Grant).  The Byrne Grant provides state
and local law enforcement agencies with a generous amount of funds for person-
nel, equipment, training, and other expenses. See id. at 278 (noting that Byrne
Grant is “the primary provider of federal criminal justice funding to state and local
governments,” and has been used to acquire body cameras and police vehicles,
and fund community programs aiming to reduce violence); see also Somin, supra
note 7, at 1253 (noting that Byrne Grant provides large amounts of assistance to
state and local law enforcement agencies, granting approximately $275 million in
2016).
21. See Vargas, supra note 6, at 188–92 (arguing that sanctuary justifications
have continued to prevail despite the Attorney General’s enactment of new condi-
tions to federal funds).
22. See City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144, at *1, *3
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017) (holding unconstitutional President Trump’s order
conditioning federal funds to sanctuary cities under Spending Clause).  The
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington noted in its
opinion that, “[t]he Spending Clause authorizes Congress to ‘lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States.’” See id. at *8 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).  The court further explained that, “[i]ncident to this
power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has
repeatedly employed the power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning
receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory
and administrative directives.” Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).  For a further discussion of the
facts of City of Seattle, see infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916
F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (enjoining enforcement of new conditions imposed
by Attorney General because Congress never granted Attorney General this
power).
24. See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (hold-
ing that DOJ had authority to withhold grants from sanctuary cities over their re-
fusal to work with federal immigration enforcement authorities, and that factors
used in evaluating grant applicants did not violate Spending Clause or Tenth
Amendment).
5
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licing Services Grant (COPS Grant), the DOJ used a points system that
prioritized cities expressing an interest in working with federal immigra-
tion enforcement authorities.25  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found con-
stitutional the DOJ’s use of the points system and preferential treatment in
the competitive application process.26  As such, the question remains as
how the conditions placed on the COPS Grant were different, if at all,
from those imposed on the Byrne Grant.27
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold the
COPS Grant conditions should not be persuasive in future litigation in-
volving similar DOJ grants because it allows the DOJ to effectively coerce
applicants into complying with federal immigration policies—a practice
that other circuits have found violates the separation of powers.28  The
policy of conditioning funds on compliance with federal immigration law
through a points system violates the Spending Clause and it is contrary to
recent holdings of many federal courts.29  Part II of this Comment dis-
cusses the background of sanctuary city litigation and describes the types
of conditions placed on federal funding, noting the similarities between
the Byrne and COPS grants.  Part III compares the analysis of federal cases
that have considered the DOJ’s conditions placed on the Byrne and COPS
grants.  Part IV critically assesses the points system employed in the COPS
Grant application, and advocates for courts to abandon the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in assessing grant conditions for sanctuary cities.  Finally, Part V
discusses the impact of these rulings, particularly the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion, on undocumented immigrants and the future of sanctuary cities.
25. See id. at 1183 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (discussing history and purpose of
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant program, delegated through
the DOJ).  Congress’s purpose in enacting the COPS Grant program was to “im-
prove communication and cooperation . . . between police officers and the com-
munities they serve,” and to ultimately increase the number of police officers on
the streets. See id.  Specifically, COPS Grant funds are used by police departments
to rehire officers who were laid off due to budgetary concerns and to hire and
train replacement officers. See id.
26. See id. at 1182 (upholding DOJ’s preferential treatment in granting com-
munity policing funds to cities that cooperate with immigration authorities and
agree to Certification of Illegal Immigration Cooperation).  The Certification of
Illegal Immigration Cooperation required the city to ensure that the DHS person-
nel had access to its jail records and detention facilities, the ability to meet with
anyone classified as an alien, and advance notice regarding the release of an alien
in custody. See id. at 1171–72.
27. See id. at 1194 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (recognizing Seventh Circuit’s ex-
planation of how federal immigration enforcement, such as raids, negatively affect
“local trust-building” that COPS grant seeks to promote because immigrants may
attribute these activities to local police and ultimately start to fear them).
28. See Toni M. Massaro & Shefali Milczarek-Desai, Constitutional Cities: Sanctu-
ary Jurisdictions, Local Voice, and Individual Liberty, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,
15–16 (2018) (discussing how local governments should use fundamental constitu-
tional principles as deterrents against abusive federal and state power, which in
turn promotes checks and balances and fair, democratic systems).
29. For a further discussion of constitutional issues arising from conditions on
federal grants, see infra notes 141–77 and accompanying text.
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II. HIT THE GROUND RUNNING: THE BEGINNINGS OF
SANCTUARY CITY LITIGATION
Congress sought to indirectly regulate sanctuary cities and immigra-
tion policy far before President Trump issued Executive Order 13,768.30
In 1996, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a statute encouraging commu-
nication between state and local governments and the federal government
regarding an individual’s immigration status.31  While the statute was in-
tended to facilitate information sharing, it did not explicitly require col-
laboration between different levels of government.32  At bottom, the
statute prohibits local officials from withholding information relating to a
resident’s immigration status when officials specifically request that infor-
mation.33  However, the statute does not explicitly mandate constant inter-
action and information-sharing with federal immigration officials.34  It
makes no mention of federal funds being conditioned on compliance; nor
does it warn against any potential consequences of violation.35
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018) (providing communication guidelines between
government agencies and Immigration and Naturalization Service); see also Exec.
Order No. 13,768, supra note 16, at 8799 (relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1373). See generally
Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law That Created Today’s Immigration Prob-
lem, VOX (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clin-
ton-immigration [https://perma.cc/L8TZ-RX6S] (noting President Clinton
signed a bill in 1966 known as the “Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act,” which restricted the rights of people who stayed in the United
States unlawfully for a period of time).  Among its other provisions, the bill made
immigrants easily eligible for deportation based on minor criminal offenses, in-
cluding nonviolent crimes. See id.
31. See Vargas, supra note 6, at 193 (discussing how Congress enacted statutes
such as 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996, in response to sanctuary jurisdictions’ unwilling-
ness to enforce existing federal immigration laws).
32. See id. at 194 (arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 was intended to merely en-
courage federal and state governments to work together in combatting immigra-
tion issues, but collaboration was not a mandate).
33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2018) (detailing government entities’ duty in shar-
ing information with Immigration and Naturalization Service).  The statute reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Fed-
eral, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in
any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or
receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual.
Id.
34. See Vargas, supra note 6, at 193–95 (noting that the federal government
has unsuccessfully tried to use the provisions of section 1373 as “tools” to try to
overcome sanctuary jurisdiction policies in court).  While courts found that state
and local laws requiring cooperation with federal authorities regarding the sharing
of immigration information were not preempted by federal law, most federal at-
tempts to punish sanctuary cities through violations of this statutory provision have
failed. See id.
35. See City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1238 (9th
Cir. 2018) (noting DOJ has not proven that federal police grants, such as Byrne
7
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In recent litigation involving the DOJ’s ability to place conditions on
federal funds, courts have relied on an abundance of Supreme Court pre-
cedent in determining the limited instances when the DOJ can exercise
this power.36  Federal appellate and district court cases striking down Pres-
ident Trump’s Executive Order provide further guidance.37  Considered
throughout these cases is the overarching question of whether the federal
government is justified in coercing cities to comply with federal immigra-
tion policies.38  Importantly, the Byrne and COPS Grant applications are
strikingly similar, and both appear to be ways for the DOJ to promote its
own policies.39
A. A Race Against Time: The History and Evolution of
Sanctuary City Jurisprudence
The extent of Congress’s power to attach conditions to federal grants
was clarified in various Supreme Court decisions, beginning in 1981 with
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman.40  In Pennhurst, the Su-
preme Court mandated that Congress state any conditions to federal
and COPS Grants, are historically conditioned on compliance with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373).
36. See Vargas, supra note 6, at 195 (noting that despite government’s argu-
ment that access to federal funds requires compliance with section 1373, sanctuary
cities have continued to prevail). See generally City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d
1163, 1174 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing various Supreme Court cases establishing
limits to conditions on federal funding).
37. See City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144, at *1, *3
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017) (holding President Trump’s Executive Order is uncon-
stitutionally coercive); see also County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d
1196, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that requiring cities to actively participate in
federal immigration enforcement as a condition of receiving federal grants violates
constitutional prohibition against federal commandeering).
38. See, e.g., City of Seattle, 2017 WL 4700144, at *22 (considering whether Ex-
ecutive Branch can require compliance if Congress did not mandate sanctuary ju-
risdictions to cooperate with enforcement of federal immigration laws such as
section 1373).  The court warned that if executive orders are misused, they can
greatly affect the system of “checks and balances,” which is one of the nation’s
most important constitutional principles. See id. at *25–26; see also Elizabeth Mc-
Cormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration Enforcement and
a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 181–82 (2016) (not-
ing how anti-sanctuary city laws could lead to dire consequences for public safety
and health in sanctuary cities, affecting virtually all residents). See generally Mas-
saro, supra note 28, at 4–6 (discussing sanctuary jurisdiction controversy and how
local and federal authorities are fighting over control of immigration
enforcement).
39. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916 F.3d
276, 280 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing details of the Byrne Grant program); see also
City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1186 (9th Cir. 2019) (Wardlaw, J., dis-
senting) (detailing history and purpose of COPS Grant, and its enactment as part
of Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act).
40. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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funds in unambiguous language.41  The Supreme Court reasoned that
when Congress explicitly spelled out its conditions, states could “know-
ingly” make a decision with a full understanding of the consequences if
they were to accept the money.42  Furthermore, if states voluntarily chose
to accept the conditions, they would be entering into a contract with Con-
gress; as such, they could not later argue the conditions had been retroac-
tively imposed.43
Indeed, while Congress retains broad power to attach conditions on
the receipt of federal funds, the Supreme Court has placed limits on that
power.44  In particular, the federal government can only induce states into
federal programs that “promote the general welfare,” and financial in-
ducement cannot turn into extreme compulsion.45  In South Dakota v.
Dole,46 Congress required states to adopt a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one years and threatened to cut 5% of federal highway funding to
states that did not comply.47  The Court held this was a valid use of Con-
gress’s spending power because of two main reasons: it addressed the na-
tional concern of safe interstate travel, and was “relatively mild
encouragement” to the states, as a 5% potential loss of highway funds was
not significant enough to cross the line into compulsion.48  By contrast,
41. See id. at 17 (“There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is
unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”).  In
Pennhurst, the plaintiffs argued that a federal-state grant program should be rein-
terpreted as “retroactively” imposing significant costs on states that received those
funds. See id. at 20–26.  The court rejected such an interpretation, holding that
conditions of the grant were clearly stated. See id. at 20.
42. See id. (providing further reasoning for its holding).  The court men-
tioned that states could only exercise their choice “knowingly” if they were “cogni-
zant of the consequences of their participation.” See id.  This need to make an
informed choice, the court noted, would be compromised if a state’s potential
obligations were “largely indeterminate.” See id. at 24.  This rule was meant to
cover situations in which a state would be unlikely to accept federal funds if it knew
the full extent of its obligations. See id. at 24–25.
43. See id. at 17 (analyzing how legislation allocating funds to states in ex-
change for compliance with certain conditions is similar to a contract between
Congress and states).
44. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (noting holding and
relative importance of case).
45. See id. at 211 (discussing limits of Congress’s spending power, and finding
statute was “reasonably calculated” to advance the general welfare and address the
national concern of safe interstate travel).
46. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
47. See id. at 211 (describing facts of case, in which South Dakota permitted its
residents over the age of nineteen to purchase beer, directly conflicting with 23
U.S.C. § 158, which permitted reduction of highway funds to a state if it had a
minimum drinking age below twenty-one).  South Dakota sought a declaratory
judgment that section 158 violated Congress’s spending power. See id. at 205.
48. See id. at 211–12 (finding that withholding a mere 5% of funds constituted
a “small financial inducement,” especially when states had other meaningful alter-
natives to obtain highway funding).  The Court also looked to several other cases
and noted it previously upheld a condition on federal grants that required 10% of
funds to be allocated for contracts involving minority businesses. See id. at 217.
9
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the Court held in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius49
that Congress misused its spending power when it threatened to eliminate
all of a state’s existing Medicaid funding if the state refused the Affordable
Care Act’s expansion in health care coverage.50  The Court held that such
a drastic reduction in federal funding amounted to “economic dragoon-
ing” and did not offer states a legitimate choice in accepting the condi-
tions in exchange for federal funds.51
Although the Supreme Court never considered whether federal po-
lice grants can be conditioned on compliance with federal immigration
policies, many district and appellate courts have reviewed this issue by vir-
tue of reviewing challenges to President Trump’s Executive Order.52  If
the Supreme Court took on this issue, it could look to a series of cases that
have ruled in favor of sanctuary cities.53  The first challenge to Trump’s
Executive Order came in County of Santa Clara v. Trump,54 where a Califor-
nia federal district court concluded that requiring cities to actively partici-
pate in federal immigration enforcement as a condition of receiving
federal grants violated the Constitution’s prohibition against federal com-
mandeering.55  The court permanently enjoined the President’s order.56
49. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
50. See id. at 581 (describing what constitutes impermissible use of Congress’s
spending power). But see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012) (not-
ing limits of state power).  In Arizona, the Supreme Court struck down provisions of
a state law allowing local police to cooperate with ICE officials. See id.  The Court
announced that under the country’s political system, “both the National and State
Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.” See id.
(citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  The Court ruled
that Arizona was involving itself in a matter of federal jurisdiction when it was
assisting ICE, and in doing so, it was actually overstepping its state authority. See id.
at 403–11.  The Court reasoned that the federal government possesses broad pow-
ers in the realm of immigration and the status of aliens, while the states have pri-
mary authority for defining and enforcing criminal law. See id. at 394.
51. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 523 (finding that threat to cut off state’s existing
Medicaid funding was essentially “a gun to the head,” given that citizens substan-
tially relied on these funds).
52. See e.g., City of Seattle v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144,
at *1, *23 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017).
53. See e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916
F.3d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 2019) (observing how federal efforts to force sanctuary cities
to cooperate have been under significant litigation pressure, as many cities have
succeeded in thwarting Attorney General’s anti-sanctuary campaign).  Several
other jurisdictions, aside from Philadelphia, sued to enjoin enforcement of the
Byrne Grant conditions, including Chicago, San Francisco, and New York. See id.
54. 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom,
City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018).
55. See id. at 1215–16 (holding section 9(a) of Executive Order is unconstitu-
tional on its face and placing nationwide injunction on its enforcement).
56. See County of Santa Clara, 275 F. Supp. at 1215–16 (discussing how courts
have applied Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle to various state
claims arguing that federal government has overstepped its bounds); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
10
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal and held that withdrawing
funds in the absence of congressional authorization was unconstitu-
tional.57  Similarly, in City of Seattle v. Trump,58 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington ruled in favor of Seattle,
holding that the Executive Order improperly tied funding to compliance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.59  In its analysis, the court reasoned that cities had
no “meaningful alternatives” to accepting federal grants, and thus, the
conditions under the Executive Order were unconstitutionally coercive
under Dole.60
Shortly after courts permanently enjoined the Executive Order, the
Trump Administration used a different strategy to further its immigration
policy: by allowing the Attorney General to condition states’ eligibility for
a longstanding DOJ-administered Byrne Grant program on compliance
with certain requirements.61  The legality of these conditions was chal-
lenged in City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General of the United States62 and City
of Chicago v. Sessions,63 in which the Third and Seventh Circuits, respec-
tively, held the Executive Branch’s actions to be a “usurpation of power”
from Congress.64
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”); Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 578 (holding that commandeering principle
applies when Congress directly commands states to regulate, or indirectly coerces
states to adopt federal regulatory system as its own).
57. See id. at 1245.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of an
injunction as to the Executive Order’s effect in California, but vacated and re-
manded the question of a nationwide injunction, ruling that it went too far. See id.
58. No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017).
59. See id. at *3 (“Congress did not delegate to the President—whether ex-
pressly, impliedly, or through acquiescence—any power or authority to condition
funding on compliance with Section 1373.”).
60. See id. at *26 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)) (not-
ing that financial inducement by Congress is allowed until it turns into
compulsion).
61. See City of Chicago v Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]n the
face of failure of Congress to pass such restrictions and the issues with the legality
of the Executive Order—on July 25, 2017, the Attorney General pursued yet an-
other path to that goal and issued the conditions for recipients of the Byrne JAG
funds that are challenged here.”).
62. 916 F.3d. 276 (3d Cir. 2019).
63. 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018).
64. See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 277 (discussing holding, reasoning, legisla-
tive history, and relevant statute).  The court in City of Chicago held that Congress
did not authorize the DOJ’s actions, and noted that there was evidence of Con-
gress repeatedly refusing to pass bills that tied funding to immigration policies. See
id. at 291; see also City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916
F.3d at 286  (finding three extra conditions imposed on Byrne Grant applications
were unlawful because neither Byrne Grant statute, nor 8 U.S.C. § 1373, gave At-
torney General authority to condition funds).  Moreover, the duties and functions
of the assistant Attorney General, as described under 34 U.S.C. § 10,102, only au-
thorized him to impose conditions in limited instances. See id. at 287–89.  The
court reasoned that Congress “delineate[d] numerous, specific circumstances”
under which the Attorney General could withhold funds from applicants for
11
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While the forgoing cases seem to represent a pattern of judgments
favorable to sanctuary cities, the Ninth Circuit took a different approach
in City of Los Angeles v. Barr,65 ruling in favor of Attorney General William
Barr, Jeff Sessions’ successor.66  In City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the DOJ maintained sufficient authority to withhold federal
COPS Grants from sanctuary jurisdictions that failed to select “immigra-
tion” as a focus area in their grant applications.67  The court held that the
DOJ was acting within its statutory authority when it prioritized agencies
that agreed to give U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ac-
cess to jail records and immigrants.68  The court noted that because the
scoring factors to determine grant eligibility merely “encourage[d]” rather
than “coerce[d]” applicants to cooperate on immigration matters, the
DOJ was not infringing on state autonomy.69
B. Neck and Neck: Overview of the Byrne Grant and COPS
Grant Application Procedures
The Seventh and the Third Circuits evaluated the constitutionality of
three new conditions imposed on applications for the Byrne Grant, which
grants, but did not give him sweeping authority to withhold funds for merely any
reason. See id. at 286.
65. 929 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2019).
66. See id. at 1169 (holding DOJ grant conditions did not violate Spending
Clause).  For a further discussion of the details of the case and the COPS grant
program, see supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. See generally Philip Ewing,
Attorney General William Barr Swears Oath of Office After Senate Confirmation, NPR (Feb.
14, 2019, 1:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/14/694751343/senate-con-
firms-william-barr-as-next-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/NG64-Z5PC] (re-
porting on former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ replacement, who carried out
the same policies as Sessions.).
67. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1177–82 (delineating eight focus areas
that COPS grant applicants chose from).  The focus areas include illegal immigra-
tion, child and youth safety, drug abuse education, prevention and intervention,
homeland security, nonviolent crime and quality of life policing, building trust and
respect, traffic/pedestrian safety, and violent crimes). See id. at 1171.  In its appli-
cation, Los Angeles selected “building trust and respect” as its focus area. See id. at
1172.
68. See id. at 1175–76 (finding DOJ’s decision to award additional points to
applicants that selected “illegal immigration” as their focus area or agreed to certi-
fication was merely subtle incentive and did not amount to coercion).  By offering
this incentive to applicants, the DOJ was not threatening to withdraw significant
funds from a jurisdiction unless they complied with certain federal requirements.
Nor was it imposing expensive responsibilities on a recipient or offering a financial
inducement to a recipient to cooperate on illegal immigration issues. See id. at
1176 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987)).
69. See id. (elaborating on court’s reasoning).  For a further discussion of the
court’s analysis, see infra Section III.B; see also Peter Margulies, Deconstructing
“Sanctuary Cities”: The Legality of Federal Grant Conditions that Require State and Local
Cooperation on Immigration Enforcement, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1507, 1509 (2018)
(arguing DOJ should be able to condition receipt of federal grants on recipients’
compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, highlighting importance of promoting informa-
tion-sharing on immigrations status of criminal suspects).
12
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is the primary provider of federal criminal justice funding to state and
local governments.70  Classified as a “formula grant,” Byrne Grant funds
are distributed based on a “statutorily fixed formula” involving the jurisdic-
tion’s total population and violent crime statistics.71  Any state or unit of
local government can submit a Byrne Grant application to the Attorney
General, and it must certify that it will comply with any rules or federal
statutes regarding the handling of federal funds.72
Although Philadelphia and Chicago were both regular recipients of
the Byrne Grant, both failed to qualify for fiscal year 2017, the same year
that the DOJ imposed the “certification,” “access,” and “notice,” condi-
tions on applicants.73  The “certification” condition required all grantees
to certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.74  The “access” condition re-
quired local correctional facilities to ensure the DHS would have access to
any state detention facility at any time.75  Lastly, the “notice” condition
required cities to provide advance notice to the DHS before an undocu-
mented immigrant was released from custody.76
City of Los Angeles, however, involved the COPS Grant program, which
was created by Congress in 1994 to combat local crime and promote pub-
lic safety.77  An applicant for a COPS Grant must specify a law enforce-
70. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916 F.3d
276, 280 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting relevance of Byrne Grant program, which is ad-
ministered by DOJ and “distributes over $80 million in awards each year”).  The
Byrne Grant was formed to commemorate a New York police officer who died on
duty. See id. at 279; see also City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d. 272, 276 (7th Cir.
2018).
71. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916 F.3d at
280 (noting calculation used to evaluate grant applicants).  The court opined that
the Attorney General’s preference of certain jurisdictions inevitably changes “the
formula grant into a discretionary one.” See id. at 290.
72. See id. at 280 (noting that applicants are generally cities or municipalities,
and discussing a component of the application).
73. See id. at 280–84 (noting several other jurisdictions that were negatively
affected and subsequently sued to enjoin enforcement of conditions, including
Chicago, San Francisco, and New York); see also City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888
F.3d. 272, 293 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court’s preliminary injunction
against “notice” and “access” conditions).
74. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 280.  Section 1373 bars states from
prohibiting their officials “from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.” See id. at 282 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373(a)).  For a further discussion of section 1373, see supra note 33 and accom-
panying text.
75. See id. (providing further details about new “access” condition imposed on
grantees).
76. See id. (providing further details about new “notice” condition imposed on
grantees).  The “notice” condition stated that upon request from the DHS, appli-
cants were required to provide “at least [forty-eight] hours advance notice of a
scheduled release of an alien held in the applicant’s custody.” See id.
77. See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1186 (9th Cir. 2019) (War-
dlaw, J., dissenting) (detailing history and purpose of COPS Grant, and its enact-
ment as part of Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act).
13
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ment and community policing strategy and select a particular crime
problem or focus area they are intending to spend the requested funds
on.78  Funds are awarded through a competitive process in which the DOJ
uses a points system to rank applicants.79  In determining total scores and
eligibility, the DOJ is authorized to award bonus points to applicants that
choose to focus on “illegal immigration” over other areas, and further addi-
tional points to applicants that agree to a certification of compliance with
federal immigration authorities.80
Los Angeles did not select either choice in its application and subse-
quently failed to receive a grant.81  The city sued the Attorney General
and argued that he exceeded his authority by giving preference to cities
and police departments that promised to help federal authorities track
immigrants.82  While the Ninth Circuit recognized that the imposed con-
ditions put Los Angeles at a competitive disadvantage, it nonetheless
found that the DOJ was not constitutionally barred from imposing them.83
III. RUNNING OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CONDITIONS
ON FEDERAL GRANTS
Since 2017, federal courts have unanimously deemed President
Trump’s Executive Order to be unconstitutional on various grounds.84
However, federal courts diverge from this unanimity when reviewing the
constitutionality of the actual conditions placed on federal grants by the
DOJ pursuant to the Executive Order.85  While the Ninth Circuit ruled in
78. See id. at 1170–71 (discussing COPS Grant application guidelines).  For a
full list of focus areas applicants can choose from, see supra note 67.
79. See id. at 1171–72 (discussing grant selection process).
80. See id. (noting that applicants who sign Certification of Illegal Immigra-
tion Cooperation are ensuring that DHS personnel will have access to applicant’s
detention facilities to meet with aliens, and provide the DHS with advance notice
of up to forty-eight hours prior to scheduled releases of aliens in custody).
81. See id. at 1172 (discussing repercussions of Los Angeles’ focus area selec-
tion and choice to decline certification for the 2017 application cycle).
82. See id. (explaining procedural history and basis for lawsuit).  The district
court agreed with Los Angeles on all claims, including that the DOJ violated both
the Spending Clause and separation of powers, and issued a permanent injunc-
tion. See id.
83. See id. at 1173 (affirming Attorney General’s argument that it was not nec-
essary for Los Angeles to choose “illegal immigration” focus area; Los Angeles
could have received additional points by selecting “homeland security” or “violent
crime” rather than “building respect” focus area).
84. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1250 (observing how executive order regarding
sanctuary cities has been subject of extensive litigation in multiple federal courts).
Somin noted that by placing conditions on federal funds and delegating power to
the Attorney General, the President is directly violating longstanding Supreme
Court precedent, which mandates that any condition on federal grants must be
authorized by Congress. See id. at 1251.
85. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916 F.3d
276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding conditions on funds were unlawfully imposed.
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/4
2020] COMMENT 205
favor of the Attorney General, the Third and Seventh Circuits ruled
against him and enjoined enforcement of conditions on federal police
grants.86  In doing so, they looked to the plain language and structure of 8
U.S.C. § 1373 to determine that Congress never intended to grant a broad
discretionary power to the Executive Branch.87
A. The Third and Seventh Circuit’s Arguments Against Conditions
on Byrne Grant Funds
The Third Circuit focused heavily on the Attorney General’s statutory
authority in its analysis.  The City of Philadelphia was a regular recipient of
the Byrne Grant, having received an average of $2.5 million each fiscal
year since the program’s inception in 2006.88  The city used these funds to
update technology in courtrooms, fund reentry programs for newly re-
leased prisoners, and operate substance abuse programs for criminals.89
However, in 2017, the DOJ withheld Philadelphia’s award, claiming that
the city failed to comply with three newly implemented conditions, which
required greater coordination with federal officials on matters of immigra-
tion enforcement.90  Litigation ensued and eventually reached the Third
Circuit, where the primary issue was whether Congress had granted the
Attorney General authority to enact the new conditions.91
But see City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding
preferential scoring system constituted a lawful use of power).
86. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1256 (noting underlying rationale behind fed-
eral courts’ decisions to enjoin enforcement of grant conditions).  Somin argues
that if the Executive Branch can impose such conditions on federal grants, regard-
less of whether or not they are “consistent with the logic and purpose of the pro-
gram,” this could give the Executive Branch an enormous amount of discretion to
reshape federal grant programs. See id.  Further, while conditions can seem consis-
tent with the logic and purpose of a program, it does not make up for the lack of
clear congressional authorization of the condition. See id.
87. See id. at 1285 (arguing how recent cases may have broader implications
on federalism).  If the Trump Administration prevails, it would greatly increase the
federal government’s power over state and local governments, potentially under-
mining the separation of powers. See id.
88. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916 F.3d
276, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2019) (emphasizing that Philadelphia did not stop receiving
funds until new conditions were imposed in 2017).
89. See id. (detailing Philadelphia’s prior uses of grant).
90. See id. (noting Attorney General’s argument that conditions were enacted
to ensure that potential recipients did not impair federal government’s ability to
ensure public safety by detaining and removing aliens upon release from local
criminal custody).  For a detailed list and discussion of the three conditions, see
supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
91. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 292 (discussing procedural history).
Philadelphia filed suit to enjoin the Attorney General from withholding its award,
and the district court granted summary judgment in its favor, finding the Attorney
General had imposed the conditions “arbitrarily and capriciously.” See id. at 284.
For equitable relief, the district court imposed a sweeping requirement on the
federal government to obtain a judicial warrant before seeking custody of any ille-
gal immigrants in city custody. See id.  On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated this
judicial warrant injunction, finding the district court abused its discretion by im-
15
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The Attorney General offered three separate statutory provisions to
justify imposing the conditions: (1) the language of the Byrne Justice Assis-
tance Grant Program Statute (the Byrne Statute), (2) the provision defin-
ing the duties of assistant attorneys general in administering the grant
program, and (3) the “certification condition” provision, which requires
compliance with applicable federal laws, including 8 U.S.C. § 1373.92  The
Third Circuit found all three sources of authority insufficient.93
The plain language of the Byrne Statute, the court found, allowed the
Attorney General to “reasonably require” applicants to report data,
records, or information to confirm they were using federal funds solely for
policing services.94  This involved asking applicants for “programmatic” or
“financial” information proving they did not use Byrne Grant funds to
“supplant state or local funds.”95  However, the scope of this power did not
extend to the furtherance of department-related priorities in immigration
policy—as such, the Attorney General could not mandate access to prison
facilities and proof of coordination with immigration agencies under the
guise of the data-reporting requirement.96  The court recognized the At-
torney General’s second source of statutory authority, 34 U.S.C.
§ 10102(a)(6)—the special conditions clause—gives assistant attorneys
general authority to place special conditions on grants and to determine
priority purposes for formula grants.97  However, the court found the text
posing a greater requirement than necessary. See id. at 293.  However, it affirmed
all other aspects of the prior holding. See id.
92. See id. at 284 (noting three different sources of authority Attorney General
offered to justify enacting new conditions).
93. See id. at 279 (finding none of these sources provided DOJ actual congres-
sional authority).  The court applied the rules of statutory interpretation in deter-
mining the meaning of provisions offered by the Attorney General, while
considering the text and structure of the statute as a whole, rather than reading
the provisions in isolation. See id. at 284.  The court also mentioned that it would
also look for guidance in “any relevant, well-established canons of statutory inter-
pretation.” See id.
94. See id. at 285 (discussing Attorney General’s interpretation of Byrne Grant
statute).  The Attorney General argued that asking for “notice” of an alien’s release
from custody was the type of information he could reasonably require, while man-
dating “access” to prison facilities constituted “appropriate coordination” with a
relevant agency. See id.  Moreover, the Attorney General argued he could require
applicants to certify that they appropriately coordinated with relevant local agen-
cies in allocating grant money. See id.
95. See id. (delineating limits of Byrne Statute and finding provision involving
data reporting and “coordination with affected agencies” did not authorize “no-
tice” and “access” conditions as Attorney General implied).
96. See id. (clarifying actual scope of Attorney General’s discretion was con-
fined to handling of funds).  The court held the Attorney General’s limited au-
thority did not extend to monitoring and reviewing states’ use of funds for
purposes unrelated to the grant program. See id.  Further, while there were very
limited circumstances in which the Attorney General could withhold a small per-
centage of funds, he could not withhold the entire grant arbitrarily. See id. at
285–86.
97. See id. at 287 (noting duties and functions of assistant attorney general).
“[T]he Assistant Attorney General shall ‘exercise such other powers and functions
16
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and structure of the statute did not authorize assistant attorneys general,
or even the Attorney General, to establish completely new conditions un-
related to the purpose of furthering criminal justice policies.98  Finally,
the court found the certification condition provision of the Byrne Statute
could not be construed to require compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.99  Do-
ing so would give the Attorney General unbounded power to impose grant
conditions and ultimately “destabilize the formula nature of the grant,”
giving it a discretionary nature instead.100  The court further reasoned
that if Congress intended the Byrne Grant to be discretionary, it would
have likely placed it in the U.S. Code’s section containing discretionary
DOJ grants, rather than giving the grant its own separate title, section, and
description.101  Thus, the court found that no statutory provision the At-
torney General offered could be construed as giving him authority to en-
act the new conditions.102
as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General . . . including placing special condi-
tions on all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants.’” See id.
(quoting 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6)).
98. See id. (finding relative placement of clause and plain text of statute
proved Attorney General did not have sweeping authority to place any conditions
on all grants).  The court found that because the special conditions clause came
before five other subsections giving assistant attorneys general power to “dissemi-
nate criminal justice information and coordinate with various agencies and offi-
cials,” this provision gave assistant attorneys general power only to the extent it was
related to policing or criminal justice. See id. at 287–88.  Providing assistant attor-
neys general more authority would be “akin to hiding an elephant in a mousehole.
‘And Congress does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’” See id. at
288. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
99. See id. at 287 (determining that a closer scrutiny of the text, structure, and
history of the provision called for a rejection of the Attorney General’s broad
view). See generally 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D) (2018) (requiring applicants to cer-
tify their compliance with provisions of Byrne Statute and “all other applicable
federal laws).  The Attorney General argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibited
restrictions on the sharing of residents’ immigration status, could be considered
an “applicable federal law,” because it applies to federal government entities. See
City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 288–89.  The court recognized the text does not
explicitly identify to what or whom laws must be applicable, given that the phrase,
“all other federal laws,” was not preceded by a list of specific federal laws in the
provision. See id.  Thus, the court found the applicable laws clause authorized only
conditions that applied specifically to programs funded under the grant, not gen-
erally to the grantee. See id.
100. See id. at 290 (discussing how the “formula” nature of Byrne Grant con-
siders only the population and violent crime statistics of a jurisdiction).  The court
held that approving the Attorney General’s broad discretion would threaten the
“predictability and consistency embedded in the program’s design.” See id.
101. See id. at 288–89 (finding intent of Congress an important consideration
in overall analysis).
102. See id. at 291.  The court noted it did not need to consider the city’s
other claims: that the conditions violated the Spending Clause, violated the Anti-
Commandeering Clause of the Tenth Amendment, and that the city was in sub-
stantial compliance with the conditions. See id. at 284.  However, the Seventh Cir-
cuit considered these claims in City of Chicago v. Sessions, when it affirmed the
district court’s preliminary injunction against the “notice” and “access” conditions.
See 888 F.3d 272, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2018).
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Around the same time the Third Circuit heard challenges to the
DOJ’s grant policies, the Seventh Circuit was also considering the validity
of the “notice” and “access” conditions of the Byrne Grant in City of Chi-
cago v. Sessions.103  Like Philadelphia, Chicago was a regular recipient of
the Byrne Grant and planned to use its 2017 funds for new software that
would help police officers quickly identify the location of shooting inci-
dents and provide an immediate response.104  The “notice” and “access”
conditions directly conflicted with Chicago’s 2006 “welcoming city” ordi-
nance, which prohibited both requests and disclosures of the immigration
status of residents.105  The ordinance also provided that city officials
would not permit ICE agents access to detainees, allow investigative inter-
views, or respond to inquiries regarding a person’s custody status.106  Chi-
cago announced it would favor its own city ordinance over the newly
imposed conditions, and filed suit, alleging the conditions were unlawful
103. See id. at 276–77 (explaining the relative timeline and procedural history
of the case).  The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held in favor of the City of Chicago regarding the Byrne Grant’s “notice” and “ac-
cess” conditions, while ruling in favor of the Attorney General in regards to the
“certification” condition. See id.  The court enjoined the enforcement of the two
conditions, finding that proper compliance with those conditions would require a
large amount of state and local resources and personnel. See id. (noting the proce-
dural history of the case and stating that, as a matter of statutory delegation, the
Executive Branch lacks the power to deny federal funds to sanctuary jurisdictions
without further congressional authorization); see also Somin, supra note 7, at 1264
(warning that if the Attorney General successfully argues he can impose new con-
ditions in the Byrne Grant application under the guise of “applicable federal laws,”
the same tactic can be used to condition many other federal grants).  Even the
“applicable federal laws provision” was too ambiguous for the court to accept. See
City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 276–77.  As mandated by Pennhurst, the federal govern-
ment cannot impose conditions on grants to states and localities unless the condi-
tions are “unambiguously” stated in the law’s text. See id. at 231 (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
104. See id. at 278 (describing how Chicago’s use of the Byrne Grant helped
finance a large portion of local law enforcement’s safekeeping resources, includ-
ing funding for body cameras and police cruisers).  In 2017, the city planned on
using the expected funds to further its ShotSpotter technology. See id.
105. See id. at 279 (acknowledging Chicago’s Welcoming City Ordinance as an
ode to its diverse demographic makeup, as nearly 20% of its residents are immi-
grants).  The ordinance calls for the “cooperation of all persons, both documented
citizens and those without documentation status” in order to protect life and prop-
erty, prevent crime, and resolve issues within the community. See id.; see also CHI.,
ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 (2016).
106. See id. at 279 (describing components of city ordinance). But see CHI.,
ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-042(c) (2016) (clarifying that provisions of the ordinance
do not apply when the subject of the investigation poses a threat to public safety).
Specifically, Chicago agreed to cooperate with immigration enforcement authori-
ties when asked for information involving individuals with an outstanding criminal
warrant, a felony conviction, or anyone identified as a gang member. See City of
Chicago, 888 F.3d at 279–80.  The court recognized Chicago’s support for undocu-
mented immigrants is limited by the city’s promise to cooperate with ICE officials
when necessary for public safety reasons. See id.
18
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under both the Byrne Statute and separation of powers principle.107  The
district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction of the “notice”
and “access” conditions.108
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit focused only on whether the Attorney
General had apparent authority to enact the conditions.109  In its analysis,
the court relied on the limit of Congress’s spending power and held that
although the Executive Branch has free reign over making policies, it can-
not use the “power of the purse” to mandate state or local governments to
comply with policies.110  The court reasoned that if the Executive Branch
could freely wield legislative power, the delicate notion of “checks and
balances” would be tarnished.111
In addition, the court held that letting the Attorney General withhold
all Byrne Grant funds would go against the “formula” nature of the
grant.112  All Byrne Grant funds are allocated based on a carefully defined
107. See id. at 280 (acknowledging Chicago’s refusal to abide by the Attorney
General’s conditions, which the city argued were inconsistent with the goals of its
ordinance).  The court further addressed how the Attorney General’s conditions
would place the city in an unpleasant catch-22. See id.  The city would be forced to
choose between obtaining necessary funds for law enforcement and maintaining
trusting relationships with the immigrant communities that often serve as close
confidantes. See id. at 281.  If local police were to collaborate with federal immigra-
tion authorities, immigrants—who are often victims and witnesses to crimes—
would be reluctant to report to local police out of fear that it would lead to detain-
ment or deportation. See id. at 280.  Ultimately, this failure to obtain victim and
witness cooperation could “allow criminals to freely target communities with a
large undocumented population, knowing their crimes will be less likely to be re-
ported,” ultimately hindering law enforcement efforts. See id.
108. See id. at 276–77 (noting procedural posture of case).
109. See id. at 283 (“This appeal turns on the more fundamental question of
whether the Attorney General possessed the authority to impose the conditions at
all.”).
110. See id. at 283 (declaring that the “power of the purse,” is inherently a
legislative power, and unless Congress delegates its authority, the Executive Branch
cannot condition the payment of federal funds to further its own political
priorities).
111. See id. at 277 (discussing the reasoning of the case).  The court stated,
“The founders of our country well understood that the concentration of power
threatens individual liberty and established a bulwark against such tyranny by cre-
ating a separation of powers among the branches of government.” Id.  The Attor-
ney General again offered the “Duties and Functions” subsection of the Byrne
Grant statute as proof of his statutory authority. See id.  Similar to the Third Cir-
cuit, the court found the Attorney General’s broad interpretation of this provision
was contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language, as it did not provide
him with open-ended authority to impose any conditions that he saw fit. See id.
Furthermore, the court held that such a broad interpretation was inconsistent with
the overall goal of the Byrne Statute, which was to support the needs of the law
enforcement while providing flexibility to state and local governments. See id.
112. See id. at 285–86 (stating that granting broad discretion to the Attorney
General to impose any conditions on grant recipients simply does not adhere to
the “formula” aspect of the Byrne Grant).  Allocation of funds is based on a metic-
ulous calculation that determines how much should be distributed to each jurisdic-
tion. See id. at 286.  Congress has stated in precise terms when the Attorney General
can deviate from the calculation. See id.
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calculation determining the base amount each state receives; the amount
increases based on the relative population and violent crime statistics of
each state.113  There are statutes authorizing the Attorney General to re-
duce funding under certain circumstances, but even these statutes place
caps on reduction.114  The court held the Attorney General’s deviation
from the precise limits prescribed by the statute was unsupported, and
affirmed the district court’s injunction.115
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Arguments in Favor of Conditions
on Federal Grant Money
Contrary to the findings of the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit ap-
proved of the DOJ’s use of immigration-related “scoring factors” for com-
munity policing grants, finding it an appropriate use of existing
discretion.116  Congress granted the Attorney General authority to admin-
ister and distribute COPS Grants in an effort to improve crime prevention
of local law enforcement.117  The statute codifying the COPS Grant gave
113. See id. at 298.  As noted in 34 U.S.C. § 10156(a)(1), the Byrne Grant
formula provides that 50% of the funds allocated by Congress for the grant are
awarded to states that qualify based on population size, while the other 50% goes
to states based on violent crime statistics. See id.  Of the amount allotted to each
state, 40% goes directly to local governments. See id.
114. See 34 U.S.C. § 10157(b) (2018) (stating in precise terms when the Attor-
ney General can deviate from the calculation).  For instance, the Attorney General
has discretion to reserve up to 5% of a state’s funds to give to another state to
prevent or combat an extraordinary increase in crime. See id.
[T]he Attorney General may reserve not more than 5 percent, to be
granted to 1 or more States or units of local government, for 1 or more of
the purposes specified in section 10152 of this title, pursuant to his deter-
mination that the same is necessary—(1) to combat, address, or otherwise
respond to precipitous or extraordinary increases in crime, or in a type or
types of crime; or (2) to prevent, compensate for, or mitigate significant
programmatic harm resulting from operation of the formula . . . .
Id. (describing authority granted to the Attorney General).  The statute also man-
dates a 10% reduction in funds if the city fails to “substantially implement” the
provisions of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. See City of Chi-
cago, 888 F.3d at 286.
115. See id. (rejecting any claim of statutory authorization for withholding
100% of funds from cities for noncompliance).
116. See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (find-
ing no issue with DOJ’s inclusion of “illegal immigration” scoring factor, which
asks applicants to define specifics of their plan to partner with federal law enforce-
ment, honor detainers, and engage in information-sharing).  In a 2-1 opinion, the
Ninth Circuit overturned a nationwide injunction issued by a Los Angeles judge.
See City of Los Angeles v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2018),
rev’d City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d 1163.
117. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1183 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (recount-
ing history and purpose behind COPS Grant program).  In 1994, Congress passed
the Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act, which led to the crea-
tion of the “Community Oriented Police Services” Grant program, as part of a
larger effort to increase the number of local police officers and to enhance their
interaction and cooperation with the community. See id.  The ultimate goal for this
increased interaction was to create supportive and trusting “community partner-
20
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the DOJ broad discretion to allocate grant money and develop a scoring
system for deciding which cities qualified for grants.118  Typically, the ap-
plication required the city to explain its need for federal assistance, pro-
vide information about its fiscal health, and agree to comply with various
provisions of federal law.119  In 2017, the same year the DOJ imposed the
Byrne Grant conditions, it also made two additions to the COPS Grant
application.120  It gave applicants the option to select “illegal immigra-
tion” as one of eight possible focus areas for spending grant money, and
an option to submit a “Certification of Illegal Immigration Coopera-
tion.”121  Cities that chose “illegal immigration” as a focus area and certi-
fied they would cooperate with federal immigration authorities gained
additional points.122
Los Angeles applied for a $3.1 million grant that year, but cited
“building trust and respect,” rather than “illegal immigration,” as its focus
ships” between police officers and community members. See id.  Congress acknowl-
edged the grant served twenty-three different purposes, but Congress only ever
awarded funds to rehire officers who were laid off due to budgetary concerns for
deployment in community-oriented policing and to hire and train new police of-
ficers for deployment in community-oriented policing. See id.
118. See id. at 1169 (explaining the DOJ’s authority in administering the selec-
tion process for the grant application).  The DOJ may also “‘promulgate regula-
tions and guidelines to carry out’ the grant program,” and can issue regulations or
guidelines mandating the correct form and content of the grant applications. See
id. (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 10382(b)).
119. See id. (examining new application requirements).  The application re-
quires completion of eleven categories of information, including the projected im-
pact of the proposed initiative and funds on other aspects of the criminal justice
system. See id.  Applicants must also “identify related governmental and commu-
nity initiatives which complement or will be coordinated with the proposal” and
“explain how the grant will be utilized to reorient the affected law enforcement
agency’s mission toward community-oriented policing.” See id. (quoting 34 U.S.C.
§ 10382(c)(4)).
120. See id. at 1171–72 (elaborating on components of the application
procedure).
121. See id. at 1172 (describing another way for COPS Grant applicants to
receive additional points in the overall calculation).  A city that submitted a certifi-
cation form agreed to implement rules and regulations to ensure that the DHS
had access to the city’s correctional facilities to meet illegal immigrants, and man-
dated that these facilities provide at least forty-eight hours’ notice before an un-
documented immigrant was released from custody. See id.  Nearly identical to the
Byrne Grant’s “notice” and “access” conditions, this meant extra points were given
to departments that wanted to hire police officers to help federal authorities de-
port immigrants. See generally Maura Dolan, After Several Court Losses, Trump Admin-
istration Wins a Case over ‘Sanctuary City’ Funding, TRIB. NEWS SERV. (July 17, 2019,
8:40 AM) https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/tns-cops-sanc-
tuary-cities-funding-doj-trump.html [https://perma.cc/2PPV-SE7J] (describing
Los Angeles’ choice to focus on “building trust and respect,” and refusal to com-
plete certification form were deciding factors in city’s failure to receive expected
police funds in 2017).
122. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1171–72 (explaining which selec-
tions lead to a preferred application).
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area, and also chose not to complete the certification.123  After receiving a
low score and failing to receive a COPS Grant, the city challenged the
DOJ’s new preferences.124  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit permitted the
DOJ’s awarding of extra points in the application process, finding it did
not violate the Spending Clause of the Constitution or exceed the DOJ’s
statutory authority, and was consistent with the goals of the program set
forth by Congress.125
1. Spending Clause Concerns
In its Spending Clause analysis, the Ninth Circuit cited Supreme
Court precedent to showcase the federal government’s broad, but not un-
limited power to attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds.126  The
court held that Congress’s exercise of the spending power must be: (1) “in
pursuit of the general welfare,” (2) sufficiently related to the federal inter-
est of a national program, (3) stated unambiguously so that states could
make an informed choice, (4) should not coerce states to comply, and (5)
should not be barred by another constitutional provision.127  The Ninth
Circuit held the DOJ, as authorized by Congress in the statute, met all five
123. See id. at 1172 (specifying city’s selection in its grant application).
124. See id. (noting city’s argument that the DOJ’s guidelines impermissibly
coerced grant applicants to enforce federal immigration law). See generally THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Trump Administration Gets Court Victory in Sanctuary Cities Case,
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/us/sanctuary-
cities-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/EPG6-RW3B] (reporting on public backlash
and protests following Ninth Circuit’s decision).
125. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1169.  In a vigorous dissent, however,
Judge Wardlaw opined that Congress intended the funds to be used for commu-
nity policing, and the enforcement of federal immigration policy is “entirely unre-
lated to community-oriented policing.” See id. at 1191 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
She further noted that a focus on apprehending immigrants might not improve
public safety, as it could “erode the trust and mutual respect on which community
policing depend[s], and the preferential treatment to applicants who prioritize
federal immigration policies is directly contrary to the “language, structure, his-
tory, and purpose” of the COPS Grant statute. See id. at 1195 (Wardlaw, J., dissent-
ing). But see Dolan, supra note 121 (reporting that Los Angeles plans to pursue an
appeal to a larger panel of the Ninth Circuit).
126. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1174 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012)) (describing what constitutes an impermissi-
ble use of Congress’s spending power); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206, 211 (1987) (same).  For a further discussion of Sebelius and Dole, see supra
notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
127. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1174 (listing elements required to jus-
tify use of spending power); see also Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 578 (describing how Con-
gress may only offer conditional funding if the state is given a “legitimate choice”
of whether to accept the conditions in exchange for funds); Dole, 483 U.S. at 211
(holding federal government can only induce states into federal programs that
“promote the general welfare,” and mere financial inducement cannot turn into
extreme compulsion); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981) (ruling that conditions of any grant program must be stated in unambigu-
ous terms).
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of these requirements when it imposed the points system.128  Cooperating
with federal enforcement officers is in pursuit of the general welfare be-
cause it “enhances public safety” and is sufficiently related to the federal
interest in addressing crime.129  The application guidelines also stated the
immigration-related conditions in clear, unambiguous terms.130  Further,
the DOJ did not financially induce applicants to cooperate on illegal im-
migration issues—rather, an applicant could choose one of many focus
areas, and some applicants even obtained funding without selecting illegal
immigration or signing the certification form.131  Lastly, the court rejected
the Tenth Amendment concern that the DOJ was infringing on state au-
tonomy.132  It found the scoring factors did not coerce, but merely en-
couraged applicants to cooperate on federal immigration matters, and
thus, it did not overrule any state laws or local ordinances.133
128. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1175–76.
129. See id. at 1175 (finding DOJ met first element of Spending Clause analy-
sis).  The court stated:  “[C]ooperation relating to enforcement of federal immi-
gration law is in pursuit of the general welfare, and meets the low bar of being
germane to the federal interest in providing the funding to ‘address crime and
disorder problems, and otherwise . . . enhance public safety . . . .’” Id. at 1176
(quoting VCCLEA § 1701(a)).
130. See id. (finding DOJ clearly presented the immigration-related conditions
in the application guidelines and certifications).
131. Compare id. (declaring DOJ does not financially induce applicants to co-
operate on matters of immigration in a way that is “so coercive that it is tanta-
mount to compulsion,” as established in Supreme Court precedent), with Sebelius,
567 U.S. at 579–80 (finding Congress’s threat to eliminate all of a state’s existing
Medicaid funding if the state chose to opt out of new universal health care plan,
was essentially a “gun to the head,” and an impermissible use of Congress’s spend-
ing power).
132. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1176 (noting the court’s standing on
the last element of a Spending Clause analysis).  The
DOJ’s decision to give points to applicants that submit the Certification
and agree to give DHS personnel access to the applicant’s correctional or
detention facilities to meet with alien detainees, or to give DHS notice
before an alien detainee is released, does not override state laws and
therefore does not give rise to any Tenth Amendment concern.
Id. at 1177.
133. See id. at 1177 (finding, at best, the DOJ’s preferential treatment of appli-
cants that selected illegal immigration as a focus area or that agreed to the certifi-
cation, merely encourages applicants to focus on these federal priorities, which
does not override any state laws).  The court reasoned:
[B]ecause an applicant is free to select other prioritized focus areas or
not to apply for a grant at all, such a subtle incentive offered by DOJ’s
scoring method is far less than the coercion in Dole, which directly re-
duced the amount of funds allocated to a state, and which the Court held
was consistent with Spending Clause principles.
Id.
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2. The DOJ’s Statutory Authority
In addition, the Ninth Circuit found that the DOJ’s use of immigra-
tion-related scoring factors did not exceed its statutory authority.134  Con-
gress authorized the DOJ to “fill in gaps” for the COPS Grant program by
creating an application form and enacting necessary regulations and
guidelines for applicants.135  This delegation of authority, the court held,
gave significant deference to the DOJ’s choices.136  The DOJ’s inclusion of
immigration-related scoring factors stemmed from its understanding of il-
legal immigration as a public safety issue, and this determination was per-
fectly reasonable.137  Nothing in the COPS Grant statute precluded the
DOJ from favoring local governments that focused on combatting illegal
immigration.138  Lastly, the court held that although the DOJ’s new scor-
ing factors were furthering the immigration policy goals of the Administra-
tion, this alone was not an adequate reason to set aside the DOJ’s decision-
making power.139  Ultimately, the court found the DOJ’s preference for
certain jurisdictions consistent with the goals of the COPS Grant program,
complied with the Spending Clause restrictions, and fell within the DOJ’s
statutory discretion.140
134. See id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)) (“When Congress has ‘explicitly left a gap for the agency
to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a spe-
cific provision of the statute by regulation.’”).
135. See id. (asserting why the DOJ’s inclusion of illegal immigration focus
area and certification should be given controlling weight, unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to the relevant grant statute).
136. See id. at 1181 (declaring the statute permits the DOJ to give certain lo-
calities “preferential consideration, where feasible” and that awarding grant funds
to localities that intend to focus on illegal  immigration is well within the statute’s
scope).
137. See id. at 1177–78 (deferring to the DOJ’s interpretation and argument).
The court further noted that the DOJ may give extra points to cities that agree to
hire veterans, or manage early intervention systems that identify and assist officers
with personal issues, or officers that have suffered school shootings. See id. at 1171.
138. See id. at 1177–78 (deferring to the DOJ’s interpretation and argument).
139. See id. at 1180 (acknowledging Congress’s expectation that the adminis-
tration’s policy goals would inevitably influence its application process when choos-
ing recipients of competitive grants, but this was not wrong per se).
140. See id. at 1183 (noting the holding of the case).  Other decisions also
held in favor of the DOJ on its ability to condition funds, including the lower court
in City of Chicago, which was ultimately appealed. See City of Chicago v. Sessions,
264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2017), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion va-
cated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, No.
17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is
a condition of the Byrne Grant because the authorizing statute states that recipi-
ents must comply with all applicable federal laws); see also S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2017) (requiring localities and campuses in Texas to cooperate with
ICE in sharing information about noncitizens, and assisting in their detention and
transfer into federal custody).  Many state governments such as Texas have ex-
pressed support for federal immigration enforcement, and have passed legislation
seeking to punish sanctuary cities. See generally Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, The New Sanctuary and Anti-Sanctuary Movements, 52 U.C. DAVIS. L.
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IV. LAPPING THE NINTH CIRCUIT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COPS
GRANT POINTS SYSTEM
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold the DOJ policy in City of Los
Angeles was a notable legal victory for the Trump Administration in sanctu-
ary city litigation involving DOJ-sponsored funds.141  This Comment ar-
gues that City of Los Angeles should have little bearing on future cases
because the COPS Grant preferences effectively coerce sanctuary cities
into complying with federal immigration policies, thus violate the separa-
tion of powers and Spending Clause.142  At best, City of Los Angeles should
remain a mere exception to the general tendency of courts in invalidating
federal grant applications that disfavor sanctuary cities.143  If the issue of
conditioning or prioritizing DOJ-sponsored police funds reaches other
courts, the Third and Seventh Circuits’ sanctuary city friendly approaches
should be followed in lieu of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in City of Los
Angeles.144  Doing so would ensure a uniform analysis of the Spending
Clause and separation of powers doctrine for two strikingly similar grants,
and ultimately promote better policy objectives.145
REV. 549, 551 (2018) (providing background information on the Texas law and the
rise of the “counter sanctuary movement” across the country). But see Margulies,
supra note 69, at 1509 (arguing that while the DOJ should be able to condition
receipt of federal grants on recipients’ compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, courts
should read that statute against the backdrop of “cooperative federalism,” result-
ing in a narrower interpretation than the one that the DOJ seeks to impose).
141. See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 124 (describing how the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in a two-to-one opinion, defied expectations and overturned a nationwide
injunction that a federal judge issued in 2018). See generally City of Los Angeles v.
Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2018), rev’d sub nom, City of Los
Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2019) (issuing a permanent, nationwide
injunction against the DOJ’s scoring system).
142. See City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 916 F.3d
276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding in favor of Philadelphia and denouncing the
DOJ’s enactment of conditions for constitutional and statutory reasons); see also
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 287 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting the wide
scope of its decision).
143. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1262 (noting how so many recent court deci-
sions have effectively strengthened state sovereignty).
144. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 279 (finding in favor of Philadelphia
regarding conditions on police funds); see also City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 281 (rec-
ognizing new “notice” and “access” conditions could result in under-reported
crime and undermine public safety).
145. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225,
1231–35 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that President’s attempt to further his own pol-
icy goals by using “power of the purse” was a violation of the Constitution’s separa-
tion of powers, as Congress has exclusive ability to use this power). See Somin,
supra note 7, at 1262 (discussing how placing conditions on federal funds and
delegating power to Attorney General directly violates Supreme Court precedent
that requires Congress to unambiguously establish conditions on federal grants in
limited circumstances); see also Massaro, supra note 28, at 4–6 (arguing that local
governments should use fundamental constitutional principles to deter against
abusive federal and state power, which will ultimately give them a voice and pro-
mote checks and balances).
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Both the Byrne and COPS Grant applications are, at their core, differ-
ent means to the same end, which is to exclude sanctuary cities from re-
ceiving police funds they otherwise qualify for.146  When the Third and
Seventh Circuits invalidated the Byrne Grant conditions, the DOJ exer-
cised a subtle change in tactics with administering the COPS Grant—
rather than imposing mandatory conditions, it offered preferential treat-
ment to cities as an incentive for them to cooperate.147  The similarities
between the Byrne Grant and COPS Grant application components, how-
ever, are easily discernible and thus, the two should be treated the same
for purposes of a separation of powers and Spending Clause analysis.148
In previous decisions, courts held the DOJ lacked the statutory au-
thority to impose notice and access conditions of the Byrne Grant, and
consequently, DOJ efforts to impose them violated the separation of pow-
ers doctrine.149  As the Seventh Circuit notes, the power of the purse, or
the spending power, lies exclusively in the hands of Congress, while the
Executive Branch only has the power to determine policy.150  If the Execu-
tive Branch also begins using the spending power to mandate that state
and local governments comply with its policies—without receiving con-
gressional authorization—then it exceeds the scope of its authority and
violates the separation of powers.151  As such, the Ninth Circuit should
have been stricter in its evaluation of the DOJ’s new method of administer-
ing the COPS Grant program.152  Neither the text, structure, nor purpose
of the Community Policing Act gave the DOJ authority to add the “illegal
to cities that were willing to cooperate with federal immigration” focus
area and cooperation certification, or to otherwise give preferential treat-
146. See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2019)
(declaring DOJ’s preferential treatment for cities that complied with federal immi-
gration law was not as coercive as placing outright conditions on the applications).
147. See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 124 (reporting on UC Hastings law
professor Dan Levine’s thoughts on the DOJ’s sophisticated, newly adopted strat-
egy; while the Justice Department was previously forcing cities to comply with fed-
eral immigration policies by retroactively imposing conditions, it is now attempting
to provide the same federal funds with some strings attached).
148. For a further discussion of the Byrne Grant and COPS Grant application,
see supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. See also City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d
at 279 (finding in favor of City in regards to conditions on police funds, and hold-
ing that the DOJ was prohibited from requiring cities’ police departments to col-
laborate with immigration agents in exchange for Byrne Grant funds).
149. See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 282 (discussing the holding of the case).
150. See id. at 277 (introducing the separation of powers doctrine as a “bul-
wark against tyranny”).
151. See id. (“If the Executive Branch can determine policy, and then use the
power of the purse to mandate compliance with that policy by the state and local
governments, all without the authorization or even acquiescence of elected legisla-
tors, that check against tyranny is forsaken.  The Attorney General in this case used
the sword of federal funding to conscript state and local authorities to aid in fed-
eral civil immigration enforcement.”).
152. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1191 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (opining
district court’s order permanently enjoining DOJ’s addition to COPS Grant appli-
cation should have been affirmed).
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ment authorities.153  In fact, Congress enacted the COPS Grant program
to increase the number of “cops on the beat,” build trust and respect be-
tween the community and police officers, and ultimately, further public
safety.154  However, Congress did not allow the DOJ to use the grant pro-
gram to coerce officers into carrying out the Administration’s immigration
agenda, which was entirely unrelated to the concept of community-ori-
ented policing and trust-building with the public.155  Thus, by making ad-
ditions to the grant application that Congress did not explicitly permit,
the DOJ exceeded its authority and violated the separation of powers.156
Further, even if Congress delegated broad power to the DOJ to impose
the points system, the Ninth Circuit should have placed a greater emphasis
on the limitations of the spending power itself.157  In particular, the appli-
cation of the COPS Grant points system seems to conflict with the “related-
ness” and “non-coercive” requirements of the Spending Clause test.158
First, the government can impose only conditions that are sufficiently re-
lated to federal interests in the grant program.159  Although the COPS
Grant does not openly impose conditions, it awards bonus points to cities
that comply with federal civil immigration enforcement.160  Offering prefer-
ential treatment for complying with immigration agents is unrelated to the
core purpose of the COPS Grant program, which is to provide assistance
to local criminal law enforcement.161  As the district court in City of Philadel-
phia reasoned, “immigration law has nothing to do with the enforcement
of local criminal laws,” although the reverse may certainly be true.162
153. See id. at 1195 (noting lack of congressional authorization was obvious
from all aspects of act codifying the COPS Grant program).
154. See id. (discussing Congress’s stated goals of program).
155. See id. (noting that while DOJ and Congress may have shared same goal
of enhancing public safety, their similarities ended there).
156. See id. (explaining limits of Congress’s goals, and impact of DOJ exceed-
ing those goals).
157. See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 639 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (discussing how Congress’s power to condition receipt of federal funds is
not unbounded).  For a further discussion of the Spending Clause factors, see
supra notes 136–133 and accompanying text.
158. For a further discussion of the Spending Clause factors, see supra notes
136–142 and accompanying text.
159. See id. (elaborating on limitations of federal government’s power).
160. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1191 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (opining
that Congress intended funds to be used for community policing, and enforce-
ment of federal immigration policy is “entirely unrelated” to community-oriented
policing).
161. See id. (explaining how the COPS Grant statute was designed for the pur-
pose of enhancing community-oriented policing, not furthering immigration
policy).
162. See City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (finding that while criminal
law is often an important aspect of immigration law, the reverse is not true; immi-
gration law does not affect enforcement of local criminal laws); see also Somin,
supra note 7, at 1266 (explaining criminal justice system notably contributes to
immigration law because it specifies which types of noncitizens face a high risk of
removal, denotes proper procedures for detaining immigrants as they wait for
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Even in sanctuary jurisdictions, criminal laws apply consistently to all re-
sidents, regardless of their immigration status.163  As the dissent in City of
Los Angeles notes, “aside from abstract allusions to public safety,” the DOJ
has never articulated exactly how the federal immigration preferences in
the COPS Grant application relate to the furtherance of community-ori-
ented policing.164  Thus, because the federal interest in enforcing immi-
gration laws falls outside the scope of the COPS Grant program, the DOJ
fails to meet the relatedness prong of the Spending Clause; the resulting
overreach by the Executive Branch represents a violation of the separation
of powers.165
Secondly, proper use of the spending power also requires that the
conditions should not coerce or financially induce states to comply.166
The Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from compel-
ling states to enact or administer federal regulatory programs, and the
anti-commandeering principle prohibits both direct and indirect coercion
by the government.167  The DOJ engages in indirect coercion when it gives
preferential treatment to applicants that comply with federal immigration
policies, while depriving others of anticipated police funds.168
their removal proceedings, and defines which individuals federal government is
trying to target when it attempts to enforce its immigration policies).
163. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1266 (noting Philadelphia police commis-
sioner’s admission that the city’s law enforcement does not waver in its enforce-
ment of local criminal laws and treats all residents “uniformly,” regardless of
whether they are lawful, unlawful, victims, witnesses, or defendants of crimes, and
that city has implemented certain policies to purposefully ignore immigration sta-
tus of residents); see also Massaro, supra note 28, at 9 (“Even the mighty spending
power of the federal government has its limits.”).
164. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1191 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (noting
why district court enjoined COPS Grant preferences).
165. See City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 639 (acknowledging that while
courts have been hesitant to invalidate grant conditions for lack of relatedness
alone, this can be an important inquiry in a larger constitutional analysis).
166. See Massaro, supra note 28, at 48 (noting how Supreme Court precedent
has evolved to hold that federalism can be violated even when federal government
uses money to induce local and state cooperation).  “State and local consent,
therefore, must be truly voluntary even when national stakes are high, even when
federal power over the subject matter is plenary, and even when the spending
power is deployed.” Id.
167. See City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 647 (specifying that in context
of Spending Clause, Tenth Amendment prohibits “impermissible compulsion” or
“commandeering” of state to the point where it is coerced to participate in a fed-
eral spending program); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519, 677 (2012) (elaborating on federal commandeering); Massarro, supra note
28, at 49–50 (“Sanctuary jurisdictions might argue that when a federal law teeters
on the edge of commandeering, federal norms that drive commandeering juris-
prudence should prompt courts to construe the law narrowly to give state and local
governments proper breathing room.”).
168. See City of Seattle v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144, at
*1, *23 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017) (opining that President Trump’s Executive
Order places cities at risk of losing all of their federal funding, which is necessary
for functioning of cities).
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The cities most likely to benefit from this type of grant are the ones
that choose “illegal immigration” as a focus area and sign a certification
form ensuring the DHS will have access to the city’s correctional facili-
ties.169  To carry out this promise and create necessary regulations, cities
would need to allocate extra resources, funds, and personnel.170  Indeed,
it seems counterintuitive to make applicants spend a significant portion of
their existing law enforcement funds simply to qualify for more.171  Aside
from prioritizing immigration and supporting the Administration’s immi-
gration policy objectives, states have few other alternatives of scoring the
necessary points to receive COPS Grant awards.172  When former Attorney
General Jeff Sessions announced the 2017 Byrne Grant recipients, he “ap-
plauded their commitment to the rule of law and to ending violent crime,
including violent crime stemming from illegal immigration.”173  It has be-
come evident that indicating support for the Administration’s immigra-
tion policy objectives has become the single most important factor in the
determination of whether states are able to qualify for COPS Grants.174
When assessing the constitutionality of DOJ-imposed conditions on
Byrne Grant awards, circuit courts have held that withholding funds to
coerce states to comply with DOJ policies is an unauthorized and im-
proper use of the spending power, and ultimately, a violation of the sepa-
ration of powers.175  In creating a points system to qualify for similar
COPS Grants, the DOJ has merely found a new and covert way to coerce
states into following its immigration policies.176  Therefore, by implement-
169. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1171 (noting how applicants can qualify
for additional points when completing a COPS Grant application and gain a com-
petitive advantage).
170. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 276–77 (7th Cir. 2018)
(finding that proper compliance with conditions, including giving federal officials
access and notice regarding undocumented immigrants, would require a large
amount of state and local resources and employees); see also New York v. Dep’t of
Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (considering similar arguments
where seven state governments and New York City challenged all three Byrne
Grant conditions).
171. See Massarro, supra note 28, at 17–18 (providing justification for why
many sanctuary jurisdictions decide not to cooperate with ICE). See generally City of
Chicago, 888 F.3d at 276–77 (providing background information regarding same).
172. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1188–91 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (not-
ing applicants may otherwise qualify for preferential consideration and receive bo-
nus points only if their local law enforcement agencies have faced a “catastrophic”
event significantly affecting their ability to hire new police officers).
173. See id. at 1191 (providing circumstantial evidence that immigration was a
determinative factor in awarding the COPS Grant in fiscal year 2017).
174. See id. (emphasizing that 80% of 2017 COPS Grant recipients had noti-
fied in their applications they would cooperate with federal immigration authori-
ties in their detention facilities).
175. See City of Philadelphia, 916 F.3d at 279 (finding in favor of the city in
regards to conditions on police funds); see also City of Chicago 888 F.3d at 287
(same).
176. See City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1190 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (detail-
ing the COPS Grant application procedures).
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ing the points system for COPS Grants, the DOJ is still effectively violating
the separation of powers as identified by the circuits in the Byrne Grant
litigation.177
V. DO NICE GUYS FINISH LAST?: LOSING STATE
AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY
Prior to City of Los Angeles, sanctuary city litigation prohibited the Ex-
ecutive Branch from using funding as a weapon to coerce states into fol-
lowing federal immigration policies.178  But the Ninth Circuit’s decision
seems entirely inconsistent with this status quo, and circuits should be con-
sistent in how they rule on grant application appeals.179  Maintaining a
uniform body of law is crucial in furthering good policy—if the federal
government is suddenly able to give monetary advantages to cities that
share its view on immigration, the future of sanctuary cities will be at
stake.180  Densely populated cities such as Philadelphia, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Chicago are no strangers to crime, and they largely depend
on federal law enforcement funds—of all types—in their anti-crime ef-
forts.181  The COPS Grant procedure effectively induces applicants to
make a decision: either stand firm on their sanctuary city status and foster
trusting relationships with their immigrant populations, or keep a func-
tioning law enforcement to ensure the safety of all residents.182  If sanctu-
177. See id. (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (“To date, every court to consider the
challenges to immigration enforcement conditions the Trump DOJ imposed on
Byrne Grants has soundly rejected them as unconstitutionally exceeding DOJ’s
statutory authority.”).
178. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1247 (arguing that recent court decisions
have generally strengthened state sovereignty). See generally City of Philadelphia, 916
F.3d at 281; City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 280 (holding in favor of sanctuary cities).
179. See generally City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1189–90 (Wardlaw, J., dissent-
ing) (noting every court that has considered challenges to immigration enforce-
ment conditions has rejected them as unconstitutionally exceeding DOJ’s statutory
authority).
180. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1284–85 (discussing effects on federalism and
the separation of powers if courts start to rule in favor of new DOJ policies).  This
commentator noted how power may start to shift away from localities and states to
federal government, as former will be more inclined to position its local policy
with federal government’s objectives in order to receive necessary funds. See id.
181. See City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th
Cir. 2018) (finding that San Francisco and Santa Clara County expect a large per-
centage of their annual policing budget to come from federal government; for
example, nearly $1.2 million of San Francisco’s $9.6 million annual budget comes
from federal grant programs).
182. See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 280 (acknowledging Chicago’s argument
that unlawful citizens or relatives of unlawful citizens may avoid contacting local
police to report crimes; in turn, this failure to obtain witness and victim coopera-
tion could hinder law enforcement efforts and ultimately incentivize criminals, as
they become accustomed to fact that their crimes are rarely reported).  The court
recognized that maintaining trust with unlawful citizens or relatives of unlawful
citizens is crucially important, as many of them are victims or witnesses to impor-
tant crimes and are a valuable source of information. See id.  If undocumented
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ary cities continuously fail to receive enough bonus points to qualify for
certain DOJ grants, they will have no choice but to change their policies to
salvage depleting police funds.183  Either way, local law enforcement agen-
cies—the ones in charge of keeping all residents safe—will bear the brunt
of this dangerous shift in power.184
As one commentator notes, obtaining victories in such cases may also
serve as an impetus for the Administration in conditioning an even wider
range of grants to further other policy objectives.185  City officials have
raised concerns that if the COPS scoring system remains in place, the cur-
rent Administration may start favoring jurisdictions that criminalize abor-
tions or allow teachers to have guns in classrooms.186  Thus, this level of
unbounded discretion upheld in City of Los Angeles may have far-reaching
consequences—giving the DOJ a renewed sense of power and motivation
to condition a variety of other government benefits in exchange for fur-
thering its own federal agenda, whether or not it involves immigration
policies.187
The question remains as to whether these obstacles to receiving fed-
eral policing funds would pass constitutional muster if taken up in an en
banc rehearing by the Ninth Circuit, or perhaps the Supreme Court.188
Ultimately, courts will be faced with complex issues, and their decisions
immigrants find out local authorities are supporting federal immigration officials,
they may avoid contacting local police to report crimes, fearing that any contact
with law enforcement will lead to deportation. See id.
183. See THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 124 (discussing how offering fed-
eral funds to cities with “strings attached” is essentially coercing cities to comply
with federal immigration policies, whether they agree with them or not).
184. See Massarro, supra note 28, at 17–18 (noting how cooperation with ICE
requests will result in local police having to forego the trusting relationships they
have built with immigrants over time, and will require them to expend their own
local funds). But see McCormick, supra note 38, at 174 (discussing how some law
enforcement agencies, in opposition to federal pressure, have started to adopt pol-
icies limiting or prohibiting involvement in federal immigration enforcement ef-
forts in order to protect public safety and preserve relationships with immigrant
community).
185. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1285 (warning that if DOJ successfully at-
taches new conditions on federal grants, it may use same tactic to condition a vari-
ety of other grants beyond immigration law, including environmental, education,
or health policy).
186. See Dolan, supra note 121 (reporting on a City of Los Angeles attorney’s
prediction that Trump Administration may use this momentum to condition other
longstanding grant programs in accordance with Administration’s policies).
187. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1285 (noting negative implications of a DOJ
victory would extend beyond just Trump Administration; for example, conserva-
tives would be concerned if a liberal president conditioned federal funds on com-
pliance with traditionally liberal policies pertaining to gun control, transgender
bathrooms, etc.); see also Dolan, supra note 121 (further discussing the far-reaching
concerns stemming from the Ninth Circuit’s decision).
188. See Dolan, supra note 121 (reporting that Los Angeles plans to pursue an
appeal to a larger panel of Ninth Circuit).
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will implicate a variety of actors.189  The autonomy of cities and local agen-
cies will be at stake, as well as the safety of citizens and immigrants alike.190
And for the most vulnerable individuals—the undocumented immi-
grants—a mere slip-up may result in a permanent return to a darker past:
the persecution, the poverty, or the war they once crossed an ocean to
escape.191
189. See McCormick, supra note 38, at 174 (noting how anti-sanctuary city laws
could lead to dire consequences for public safety and health in sanctuary cities,
affecting virtually all residents, regardless of their immigration status).
190. See id. (recounting history of sanctuary cities, and how states’ and cities’
efforts to refrain from sharing immigration status of individuals was promoting
safety and well-being of entire community).
191. See Vargas, supra note 6, at 188 (describing how undocumented immi-
grants live in constant fear and apprehension, and can be detained and deported
back to their home country even after a mere slip-up with law enforcement). See
generally Robbins, supra note 2 (describing the story of twenty-seven-year-old un-
documented immigrant Aboubacar Dembele who was deported back to his home
country after being charged with a misdemeanor).
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/4
